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PROPOSITION Prescription Drug Discounts.

79

State-Negotiated Rebates.
Initiative Statute.

PROPOSITION Electric Service Providers.

80

Regulation.
Initiative Statute.

SUMMARY
Provides drug discounts to Californians with qualifying
incomes. Funded by state-negotiated drug manufacturer
rebates. Prohibits Medi-Cal contracts with manufacturers
not providing Medicaid best price. Fiscal Impact: State
costs for administration and outreach in low tens of
millions of dollars annually. State costs for advance
funding for rebates. Unknown potentially significant:
(1) net costs or savings for Medi-Cal and (2) savings for
state and county health programs.

SUMMARY
Subjects electric service providers to regulation by
California Public Utilities Commission. Restricts electricity
customers’ ability to switch from private utilities to other
providers. Requires all retail electric sellers to increase
renewable energy resource procurement by 2010.
Fiscal Impact: Potential annual administrative costs
ranging from negligible to $4 million, paid by fees.
Unknown net impact on state and local costs and revenues
from uncertain impact on electricity rates.

WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES
A YES vote on this measure
means: A new state drug
discount program would be
created to reduce the costs
that certain residents of the
state, including persons in
families with an income at
or below 400 percent of the
federal poverty level, would
pay for prescription drugs
purchased at pharmacies.
The new program would
be linked to Medi-Cal for
the purpose of obtaining
rebates on drugs.

WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES
A YES vote on this measure
means: The Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) would
have broadened authority
to regulate electric service
providers.
The
PUC’s
current policies related to
the electricity procurement
process, resource adequacy
requirements,
and
the
renewables portfolio standard
would be put into law. Small
electricity customers in
existing buildings could not
be required to accept timedifferentiated
electricity
rates without their consent.
The current prohibition
on new “direct access” for
electricity service would be
continued beyond 2015.

NO
A NO vote on this measure
means: The PUC would not
have broadened authority
to regulate electric service
providers. The PUC’s current
policies related to the electricity
procurement process, resource
adequacy requirements, and
the renewables portfolio
standard would not be put
into law. The PUC would
determine whether and how
small electricity customers
in existing buildings would
be required to have timedifferentiated
electricity
service. New “direct access”
for electricity service would
continue to be prohibited
until 2015, after which
time it would be allowed.

ARGUMENTS
PRO
Vote YES to make sure
we NEVER AGAIN face
the blackouts and market
manipulation caused by
deregulation. Proposition
80 guarantees a stable and
reliable electric system with
ample supplies of clean,
affordable
power
and
increased use of renewable
resources. Vote YES for
lower rates, environmental
protection, and no more
deregulation.

CON
Proposition 80 is a highrisk, anticonsumer, antienvironmental approach to
California’s energy future.
It limits green energy
from solar and geothermal
resources. This confusing
measure won’t lower electric
bills, won’t prevent blackouts,
and eliminates consumer
choice. Complex energy
policy should be developed
with public hearings, not
through the initiative process.

ARGUMENTS
PRO
Prop.
79
provides
ENFORCEABLE discounts
on prescription drugs for
millions of Californians.
Prop. 79 provides DEEPER
DISCOUNTS TO MORE
PEOPLE than the drug
industry’s “voluntary” Prop. 78.
Prop. 79 saves taxpayers money
by reducing prescription drug
costs. JOIN CONSUMER,
HEALTH, AND SENIOR
CITIZEN ADVOCATES and
VOTE YES on Prop. 79.

NO
A NO vote on this measure
means: The state would not
expand its drug discount
program
beyond
an
existing state program that
assists elderly and disabled
persons on Medicare.

CON
Proposition 79 can’t deliver
what it promises. It’s based
on a failed program from
Maine that never took
effect. Prop. 79 won’t receive
federal approval because
it threatens poor patients’
access to needed drugs.
Proposition 79 creates a big
government bureaucracy
costing millions. Worse, trial
lawyers can file thousands
of
frivolous
lawsuits.
www.calrxnow.org

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
AGAINST
FOR
Californians Against
Anthony Wright
the Wrong Prescription
Health Access California
1415 L Street, Suite 1250
414 13th Street, Suite 450
Sacramento, CA 95814
Oakland, CA 94612
info@calrxnow.org
(510) 873-8787
www.calrxnow.org
awright@health-access.org
www.VoteYesOnProp79.com

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
AGAINST
FOR
Bob Pence
Mindy Spatt
Californians for
The Utility Reform
Reliable Electricity
Network (TURN)
1717 I Street
711 Van Ness Avenue,
Sacramento, CA 95814
Suite 350
(916) 551-2513
San Francisco, CA 94102
www.noprop80.com
(415) 929-8876
info@yesonproposition80.com
www.yesonproposition80.com
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ELECTRIC SERVICE PROVIDERS.
REGULATION.
INITIATIVE STATUTE.

Official Title and Summary

Prepared by the Attorney General

Electric Service Providers. Regulation. Initiative Statute.
• Subjects electric service providers, as defined, to control and regulation by California Public Utilities
Commission.
• Imposes restrictions on electricity customers’ ability to switch from private utilities to other electric
providers.
• Provides that registration by electric service providers with Commission constitutes providers’ consent to
regulation.
• Requires all retail electric sellers, instead of just private utilities, to increase renewable energy resource
procurement by at least 1% each year, with 20% of retail sales procured from renewable energy by 2010,
instead of current requirement of 2017.
• Imposes duties on Commission, Legislature and electrical providers.

Summary of Legislative Analyst’s Estimate of Net State and Local
Government Fiscal Impact:
• Potential annual state administrative costs ranging from negligible up to around $4 million for regulatory
activities of the California Public Utilities Commission, paid for by fee revenues.
• Unknown net impact on state and local government costs and revenues due to the measure’s uncertain
impact on retail electricity rates.

ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
Background
Provision of Electricity Service. Californians
generally receive their electricity service from one
of three types of providers: investor owned utilities
(IOUs), local publicly owned electric utilities, and
electric service providers (ESPs). Investor owned
utilities have a defined geographic service area
and are required by law to serve customers in that
area. The three largest electricity IOUs in the state
are Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Southern
California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas &
Electric Company. The California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) regulates the IOUs’ rates and
how electricity service is provided to their customers
(commonly referred to as “terms of service”). (See
the nearby text box for definitions of commonly used
terms throughout this analysis.)
Publicly owned electric utilities are public entities
that provide electric service to residents and
businesses in their local area. Unlike IOUs, they are
not regulated by the PUC. Major publicly owned
electric utilities include the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power, the Sacramento Municipal
Utility District, and the Imperial Irrigation District.
The ESPs provide retail electricity service to
customers who have chosen not to receive electricity
service from the utility that serves their area.

50 Title and Summary/Analysis

Instead, these customers have entered into “direct
access” contracts with ESPs for their electricity.
This electricity is delivered to these ESP customers
through the transmission and distribution system
of their local utility. There are currently eighteen
registered ESPs operating in the state, generally
serving large industrial and commercial businesses.
The ESPs also provide electricity to certain state and
local government entities, such as the California
State University system, several University of
California campuses, some community college
districts, and some local school districts.
Under current law, ESPs are only required to
register with the PUC for licensing purposes; their
rates and terms of service are not regulated by
the PUC. However, the PUC has applied certain
additional requirements to ESPs (discussed below).
Currently, the IOUs provide about 71 percent of
the electricity in the state; publicly owned electric
utilities provide 14 percent; ESPs provide 11 percent;
and the state’s Department of Water Resources
provides 4 percent (chiefly for the operation of the
State Water Project).
Deregulation and Direct Access. California began
the process of restructuring electricity service in
the early 1990s by introducing competition into
the generation of electricity, with the ultimate goal
being lower prices for IOU customers. The plan
ultimately adopted in 1996 included a “transition”
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Electric Service Providers. Regulation.
Initiative Statute.

ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST (CONTINUED)
COMMONLY USED TERMS—PROPOSITION 80
 Community Choice Aggregation—The authority
of a city or county to aggregate all the electrical
demand of the residents, businesses, and
municipal users under its jurisdiction and to
meet this demand from an electricity provider
other than the electric utility currently serving
that local area.
 Direct Access—Retail electricity service is
provided to a customer directly from an electric
service provider, rather than from the utility
(local publicly owned or investor owned) that
serves the customer’s area.
 ESP (Electric Service Provider) —Companies
that provide retail electricity service directly
to customers who have chosen not to receive
service from the utility that serves their area.
Customers of ESPs are referred to as “direct
access” customers.
 IOU (Investor Owned Utility) —Privately owned
electric utilities that have a defined geographic
service area and are required by law to serve
customers in that area. The Public Utilities
Commission regulates the IOUs’ rates and terms
of service.
 Procurement Process—The process, overseen
by the Public Utilities Commission, through
which the IOUs secure long-term electricity
supplies through competitive bidding.
 PUC (Public Utilities Commission) —The state
agency that regulates various types of utilities,
including investor owned electric utilities.
 Renewables Portfolio Standard—Requirement
that electricity providers increase their share of
electricity generated from renewable sources
(such as wind or solar power) according to a
specified timeline.
 Resource Adequacy Requirement—Requirement
of the PUC that IOUs and ESPs show that
they will have adequate electricity supplies to
meet projected demand and maintain system
reliability.
 Time-Differentiated Electricity Rates—An
electricity rate structure under which customers
would be charged different prices for electricity
based on the time of day in which it is used,
given that the availability and cost of providing
electricity varies depending on the time of day.

For text of Proposition 80 see page 72.

period during which the IOUs were to sell off their
fossil fuel power plants to independent generators,
while retaining their hydroelectric and nuclear
power plants. During this transition period, the PUC
continued to regulate the IOUs’ rates. Eventually,
however, electricity purchases and customer rates
were to be determined in a competitive market. In
such a market, customers could choose to have the
IOUs purchase the electricity on their behalf, or
they could purchase electric power directly from ESPs
through “direct access.”
The deregulation process was put on hold in
response to the energy crisis that arose in 2000 and
early 2001. At that time, the combination of sharply
rising electricity demand, lagging investment in new
power plants, and other factors led to electricity
shortages and sharply rising prices. At that point, two
of the IOUs were still under the transition period
and therefore remained under PUC rate regulation.
These IOUs were not permitted to pass along the
sharply rising wholesale costs to their customers and
were pushed into near financial insolvency.
In response to the energy crisis, the state began
purchasing electricity on behalf of the IOUs and
halted several aspects of deregulation. Among these,
the state prevented the IOUs from continuing to
sell their power plants and suspended new direct
access for IOU customers. Under existing law, this
suspension will continue until long-term electricity
contracts signed on behalf of the IOUs by the
Department of Water Resources expire. The last of
the contracts expires in 2015.
While individual customers are currently barred
from entering into direct access service, current
law does allow a city or county to aggregate all the
electrical demand of the residents, businesses, and
municipal users under its jurisdiction and to meet
this demand from an electricity provider other
than the local IOU, such as an ESP. This variation
on direct access is referred to as “community
choice aggregation.”
Long-Term Procurement Process and Resource
Adequacy Requirements. As required by current law,
the PUC is currently overseeing a process through
which the IOUs secure long-term electricity supplies
through a competitive bidding process. Under this
competitive “procurement process,” the IOUs select
a mix of electricity supplied by their own power
plants and electricity provided under contract from
other generators to meet their long-term electricity
needs. The PUC approved the IOUs’ first long-term
procurement plans in April 2004.

Analysis
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ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST (CONTINUED)
In addition, the PUC has adopted rules requiring
both the IOUs and the ESPs to show that they will
have enough electricity to meet projected demand,
known as a resource adequacy requirement.
Renewables Portfolio Standard. Current law requires
that electricity providers, including the IOUs,
community choice aggregators, and ESPs, increase
their share of electricity generated from renewable
sources (such as solar or wind power) by 1 percent
per year, up to 20 percent of their total electricity
supply by 2017. This requirement is known as the
renewables portfolio standard.
The PUC has adopted a policy of accelerating
the 20 percent requirement to 2010, but this is
not required by law. Current law does not require
electricity providers to continue to increase the
proportion of their electricity from renewable
sources once they have reached the 20 percent
requirement.
Time-Differentiated Electricity Rates. Generally,
all but the largest electricity consumers pay
electricity rates that do not change based on the
time of day or season. The IOUs have submitted
proposals to the PUC to implement a system of
time-differentiated rates that would apply to more
consumers. Under such a system, customers would
be charged different prices for electricity based
on the time of day in which it is used, given that
the cost to the IOUs of providing electricity varies
depending on the time of day. For example, during
peak demand times, customers would pay higher
rates, while they would pay lower rates during the
lower demand times of the day. In theory, timedifferentiated pricing would encourage consumers
to reduce electricity consumption during periods
of peak demand, typically hot summer afternoons
when electricity supply is the tightest and therefore
its cost is high. The PUC is currently considering
IOU proposals to implement time-differentiated
rates in a regulatory proceeding, and has not yet
determined how such a system of rates would be
applied to more consumers.
Proposal
Overview of Measure. The measure addresses a
number of aspects of the state’s electricity market:
the regulation of the ESPs and direct access,
the procurement process, resource adequacy
requirements, the renewables portfolio standard, and
the use of time-differentiated electricity rates. Each
of these aspects is discussed below.

52 Analysis

Regulation of ESPs. The measure places the ESPs
under the “ jurisdiction, control and regulation” of
the PUC. The measure specifies that the scope of this
regulation includes the enforcement of requirements
related to energy procurement, contracting
standards, resource adequacy, energy efficiency,
demand response, and the renewables portfolio
standard. While the measure broadens the authority
of the PUC to regulate the ESPs, it does not, however,
specify the extent to which it would regulate ESP
rates and terms of service.
Direct Access. In general, the measure bars any
customer currently receiving electricity service
from an IOU from switching to an ESP. Customers
currently being served by direct access contracts with
ESPs could continue to receive electricity service
from ESPs, effectively “grandfathering” in their
direct access service. Direct access customers could
also return to IOU electricity service under specified
conditions. The measure does not restrict current or
future community choice aggregation.
Procurement Process. The measure requires that the
PUC implement a long-term procurement process,
and directs the PUC to consider a series of factors in
evaluating the IOUs’ long-term procurement plans.
While the PUC generally now considers the factors
listed in the measure, current law does not specify
that all of these factors be considered.
The measure also requires that the first priority
for IOUs in procuring new electricity is to be from
“cost-effective” energy efficiency and conservation
programs, followed by “cost-effective” renewable
resources, and then from traditional sources such
as fossil fuel burning power plants. This “loading
order,” as it is known, has been adopted by the PUC,
but is not currently required by law.
Resource Adequacy Requirement. The measure
requires both the IOUs and ESPs to show that they
are able to meet peak demand with adequate reserves
to ensure system reliability. This puts into law current
PUC practice.
Renewables Portfolio Standard. The measure
accelerates to December 31, 2010, the deadline for
the IOUs and ESPs to meet the 20 percent renewable
resources requirement, consistent with a recent PUC
decision. The measure also deletes a provision in
existing law that explicitly provides that electricity
providers are not required to increase their share
of electricity from renewable sources once the
20 percent requirement has been reached.
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ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST (CONTINUED)
Time-Differentiated Electricity Rates. Under the
measure, residential and small commercial customers
with electricity use under a specified amount and in
a building built before January 2006 could not be
required to pay time-differentiated electricity rates
without their consent.
Amending the Measure. The measure states that the
Legislature may amend the measure only to achieve
its “purposes and intent” and would require a twothirds vote of both legislative houses and signature
of the Governor to do so. To the extent that the
measure puts into law existing processes and
policies of the PUC that are not currently required
by law, the measure would make it more difficult
for the state to modify these practices and policies
when, for example, conditions in the electricity
market change.
Fiscal Effects
State Administrative Costs to Implement Measure. The
measure could increase the PUC’s administrative
costs, largely depending on the extent to which
the commission exercises the broadened authority
given to it under the measure to regulate the ESPs.
The fiscal impact on the PUC could range from a
negligible cost up to around $4 million annually.
The upper end of the range would occur if the
PUC regulates the rates and terms of service of the
ESPs. The measure, however, would not increase the
PUC’s costs in areas where the measure puts into
law existing PUC practices related to procurement,
resource adequacy, and the renewables portfolio
standard. Under current law, the potential
additional costs would be funded by fees paid by
electricity customers.
Uncertain Impact on State and Local Costs and
Revenues. The primary fiscal effect of this measure

For text of Proposition 80 see page 72.

on state and local governments would depend on the
impact it would have on electricity rates.
Changes in electricity rates would affect
government costs since state and local governments
are large consumers of electricity. To the extent
that the measure limits state and local governments
from entering into new direct access contracts,
the measure takes away an opportunity for these
government entities to potentially reduce their
electricity costs.
State and local revenues would be affected by the
measure’s impact on electricity rates, since tax
revenues received by governments are affected by
business profits, personal income, and sales—all
of which in turn are affected by what persons and
businesses pay for electricity.
It is not possible to determine the net effect of this
measure on electricity rates (and hence state and
local government costs and revenues), as the net
impact would be influenced by several potentially
offsetting factors. For example:
• To the extent that the measure increases certainty
about the structure of the electricity market, this may
encourage additional investment in the market.
Such investment, including the construction of
new generation, could increase the supply of
electricity and potentially lower electricity rates.
• On the other hand, the measure’s ban on
customers entering into new direct access
contracts with ESPs could result in higher
electricity rates over the long term by limiting
competition in the retail electricity market.
The measure’s impact on retail electricity rates
would be influenced by a number of factors,
including the specific structure of the regulations
adopted by the PUC to implement the proposition.
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Argument in Favor of Proposition 80
Five years ago, California was devastated by an electricity
crisis.
Enron and other energy traders held Californians
hostage, extorting tens of billions of dollars from us. They
manipulated the electricity market, driving up wholesale
prices 1000%. Californians faced rolling blackouts and
untold economic damage.
Audiotapes released by the U.S. Justice Department
revealed Enron energy traders boasting of “making
buckets of money” by creating power shortages. One trader
laughed about “all the money you guys stole from those
poor grandmothers in California,” while another ordered a
power plant worker to “ just go ahead and shut her down.”
California’s failed experiment in electric deregulation
cost our people and businesses billions of dollars.
We learned many lessons from that disaster. The state
has taken some positive steps to clean up the mess—but not
nearly enough. Amazingly, legislation to require sufficient
supplies of electricity was vetoed by the Governor last year.
That’s why Proposition 80—the Repeal of Deregulation
and Blackout Prevention Act—is on the ballot.
It provides critical reforms to make sure our deregulation
nightmare never returns.
It provides the stability necessary to ensure long-term
investment in new, clean electricity supplies.
Here’s how Proposition 80 accomplishes these goals:
Lower rates. It requires independent generators and
utilities to compete against each other to give ratepayers the
best deal on new power plants.
Adequate supplies. It requires all electricity providers
to have enough power and reserves to keep the lights
on. That simple requirement—critical to ending market
manipulation and keeping the system stable—was vetoed
last year.
Market stability. It makes sure that utilities know how
many customers they will have to serve, so they can make
long-term investments in new supplies. Amazingly,

deregulation advocates have pushed legislation that would
create more uncertainty and destabilize the market.
Regulation. It ensures that all electricity providers are
subject to regulation and control, so that traders cannot
manipulate the system.
Renewables and energy efficiency. It speeds up the shift
to renewable energy, and gives first priority to energy
efficiency programs.
Ratepayer protection. It prevents small ratepayers from
being forced onto potentially expensive time-of-use rates
without their consent—especially important in hot climates.
Proposition 80 was carefully drafted by the state’s
foremost consumer advocates and legal experts. It allows for
amendments by the Legislature consistent with its purposes,
to adjust to changing times.
Proposition 80 is a common-sense measure that achieves
a clear goal:
Never again will California be taken to the cleaners by
greedy energy traders.
Never again will we be subject to rolling blackouts and
skyrocketing electricity prices because of power shortages
and market manipulation.
Instead, Proposition 80 means that Californians can
look forward to getting the cleanest, greenest energy at the
lowest possible prices.
Proposition 80 means that Californians can expect a
stable electricity future, with sensible long-term investment
in cost-effective energy solutions.
That’s why consumers, seniors, environmentalists,
business groups, labor organizations, minority groups, and
people from all walks of life support Proposition 80.
ROBERT FINKELSTEIN, Executive Director
The Utility Reform Network (TURN)
RICHARD HOLOBER, Executive Director
Consumer Federation of California
NAN BRASMER, President
California Alliance of Retired Americans

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 80
Proposition 80 is the wrong way to make energy policy for
California. The initiative would lock in renewable energy goals
established back in 2002, even though environmental groups
and Governor Schwarzenegger have urged that California
should set higher targets for renewable energy. The initiative
would make it harder for the Legislature to pass a stronger
renewable plan in the future.
Proposition 80 is the wrong way for California. Vote NO on
Proposition 80.
V. John White, Executive Director
Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies
We agree with Mr. White and believe the proponents’ confusing
argument shows just how risky Proposition 80 really is. No one
wants to relive the Enron Era. This vote is about the future,
not the past.
PROPOSITION 80 IS POORLY WRITTEN, RISKY ENERGY
POLICY. IT’S BAD FOR CONSUMERS AND BAD FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT. Energy policy is too complex for the initiative
process and should be developed through a more comprehensive
approach that includes public hearings.

54 Arguments

What does Proposition 80 mean to you?
PROPOSITION 80 WON’T PREVENT ANOTHER ENERGY
CRISIS OR FUTURE BLACKOUTS. In fact, it could stall
investment in new power plants California needs to prevent another
energy crisis.
PROPOSITION 80 WON’T LOWER YOUR ELECTRIC BILL
AND IT ELIMINATES CUSTOMER CHOICE. Proposition 80
prohibits power consumers like schools and hospitals from buying
cheaper and cleaner energy, making needed goods and services more
expensive and placing our environment at risk.
Proposition 80 is too risky. Protect consumers and the
environment. Vote No on Proposition 80.
LES NELSON, President
California Solar Energy Industries Association
DOROTHY ROTHROCK, Co-Chair
Californians for Reliable Electricity
TONY VALENZUELA, Associate Vice President
Facilities, Development and Operations at
San Jose State University

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.
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Argument Against Proposition 80
Proposition 80 is a high-risk approach that could hurt
consumers, the environment and the state’s economy. This deeply
flawed measure will undermine the security of state energy supplies,
undercut the availability of affordable electricity and undercut
the construction of environmentally-friendly renewable energy
generation from wind, solar, and geothermal resources.
It will sharply restrict consumer choice about who we buy our
electricity from and how much we pay for services. It could
well lead us down the road toward another serious energy
crisis. That’s because Proposition 80 is the wrong way to
make energy policy for California.
Reinventing California’s energy system through the
initiative process, without public hearings is too great a risk
to take. Instead, this critical issue should be addressed
carefully through public hearings that involve all affected
parties, including the state Utility and Energy Commissions,
consumer groups, and small business associations.
Because Proposition 80 takes away energy choices and
price competition, energy cost savings will be limited or lost
for many of California’s vital institutions such as community
colleges, the University of California and the State
University systems, local school districts, hospitals, and city
and county governments. Taxpayers, students, teachers, and
patients will ultimately pay for these higher energy costs.
PROPOSITION 80 TAKES AWAY THE RIGHT OF
CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES TO CHOOSE AN ENERGY
SUPPLIER THAT CAN SAVE MONEY. Just when California
needs more jobs and investments in our infrastructure to
help our economy, Proposition 80 sends the wrong signal
of uncertainty and risk. Proposition 80 takes away an
energy choice that often attracts high paying jobs and
new investment.

Proposition 80 would make it extremely difficult to improve the
State’s standards for generating electricity from renewable sources,
which could seriously undermine adoption of wind, solar, and
geothermal technologies. Growth of California’s green businesses
could be placed at risk.
Electricity regulation is too risky to be addressed through the
initiative process. Flaws in this measure will be very difficult
or impossible to fix. Proposition 80 is bad policy because it:
• Restricts energy choices for all consumers, big and small.
• Limits the market for increasing solar, wind, and
geothermal energy resources—even if demanded by
consumers.
• Threatens to increase the cost of energy for community
colleges, the University of California and State University
systems, hospitals, and local governments that will end
up being paid by taxpayers.
• Discourages future jobs and business investment in
California.
• Destabilizes the current progress toward a secure energy
future for California.
Proposition 80 IS A HIGH RISK PROPOSITION THAT WILL
HURT CONSUMERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Vote NO on
Proposition 80.
LES NELSON, President
California Solar Energy Industries Association
KARL GAWELL, Executive Director
Geothermal Energy Association
JAMES SWEENEY, Co-Director of the Energy,
Natural Resources and the Environment Program at the
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 80
The opponents’ argument makes the case FOR
Proposition 80. They want to bring back deregulation by
calling it consumer choice!
The first round of deregulation also emphasized
“consumer choice.” The “choice” for consumers was higher
rates, market manipulation, and rolling blackouts.
Deregulation brought a reliable electric system to its
knees. It allowed traders to manipulate the market. Enron
signed up the University of California—and then walked
away. The State was forced into expensive long-term
contracts to clean up the mess! And ordinary consumers had no
real choices.
Proposition 80 reins in deregulation and ensures that
electricity providers are accountable in the future. That’s the
number one reason you should vote for it.
The opponents’ other claims are simply wrong.
Renewables? Proposition 80 not only speeds up from
2017 to 2010 the deadline for purchasing 20% of our energy
needs from renewables, it repeals the existing legal limit on
utilities’ purchases of renewables. How can that be bad for
renewable energy?

Misuse of the initiative process? Major provisions of
Proposition 80 passed the Legislature but were vetoed at the
urging of energy company lobbyists. This is exactly what the
initiative process was designed for.
Competition? Proposition 80 embraces competition
between independent generators and utilities to build
power plants at the lowest cost to consumers.
Don’t be swayed by fear tactics from the energy
companies! We’ve had enough failure. Proposition 80 will
stabilize the electrical system, avoid blackouts, bring rates
down, and benefit all Californians.
Vote YES on Proposition 80.
MIKE MOWREY, International Vice-President, 9th District
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO
HENRY L. (HANK) LACAYO, State President
Congress of California Seniors
STEVE BLACKLEDGE, Policy Director
California Public Interest Research Group (CalPIRG)

Arguments printed on this page are the opinions of the authors and have not been checked for accuracy by any official agency. Arguments
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TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS

(PROPOSITION 79 CONTINUED)

(b) As an alternative to the adoption of regulations pursuant
to subdivision (a), and notwithstanding Chapter 3.5 (commencing
with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the
Government Code, the director may implement this article, in
whole or in part, by means of a provider bulletin or other similar
instructions, without taking regulatory action, provided that no
such bulletin or other similar instructions shall remain in effect
after July 31, 2007. It is the intent that regulations adopted pursuant
to subdivision (a) shall be in place on or before July 31, 2007.
CHAPTER 7. ENFORCEMENT
130570. The Attorney General, upon the Attorney General’s
own initiative or upon petition of the department or of 50 or more
residents of the state, shall investigate suspected violations of this
division.
130571. The Attorney General may require, by summons,
the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of
books and papers before the Attorney General related to any such
matter under investigation. The summons must be served in the
same manner as summonses for witnesses in criminal cases, and
all provisions of law related to criminal cases apply to summonses
issued under this section so far as they are applicable. All
investigations or hearings under this section to which witnesses are
summoned or called upon to testify or to produce books, records,
or correspondence are public or private at the choice of the person
summoned and must be held in the county where the act to be
investigated is alleged to have been committed, or if the investigation
is on petition, it must be held in the county in which the petitioners
reside.
130572. A court of competent jurisdiction may by order,
upon application of the Attorney General, compel the attendance
of witnesses, the production of books and papers, including
correspondence, and the giving of testimony before the Attorney
General in the same manner and to the same extent as before the
superior court. Any failure to obey such an order may be punishable
by that court as a contempt.
130574. If the Attorney General fails to act within 180 days to
investigate suspected violations of this division, any person acting
for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public may
seek to obtain, in addition to other remedies, injunctive relief and
a civil penalty in an amount of up to one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) or three times the amount of the damages, plus the costs
of suit, including necessary and reasonable investigative costs,
reasonable expert fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
SEC. 1.5. Division 112.5 (commencing with Section 130600) is
added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

DIVISION 112.5. PROFITEERING
IN PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
130600. Profiteering in prescription drugs is unlawful and is
subject to the provisions of this section. The provisions of this section
apply to manufacturers, distributors, and labelers of prescription drugs.
A manufacturer, distributor, or labeler of prescription drugs engages in
illegal profiteering if that manufacturer, distributor or labeler:
(a) Exacts or demands an unconscionable price;
(b) Exacts or demands prices or terms that lead to any unjust or
unreasonable profit;
(c) Discriminates unreasonably against any person in the sale,
exchange, distribution, or handling of prescription drugs dispensed or
delivered in the state; or
(d) Intentionally prevents, limits, lessens, or restricts the sale or
distribution of prescription drugs in this state in retaliation for the
provisions of this chapter.
130601. Each violation of this division is a civil violation for
which the Attorney General or any person acting for the interests of
itself, its members, or the general public may obtain, in addition to
other remedies, injunctive relief and a civil penalty in an amount of
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or three times the amount
of the damages, whichever is greater, plus the costs of suit, including
necessary and reasonable investigative costs, reasonable expert fees,
and reasonable attorney’s fees.
SEC. 2. (a) This act shall be broadly construed and applied in
order to fully promote its underlying purposes. If any provision of this
initiative conflicts directly or indirectly with any other provisions of law,
or any other statute previously enacted by the Legislature, it is the intent
of the voters that such provisions shall be null and void to the extent that
they are inconsistent with this initiative and are hereby repealed.
(b) No provision of this act may be amended by the Legislature
except to further the purposes of that provision by a statute passed in
each house by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the
membership concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only
when approved by the electorate. No amendment by the Legislature
shall be deemed to further the purposes of this act unless it furthers the
purpose of the specific provision of this act that is being amended. In
any judicial action with respect to any legislative amendment, the
court shall exercise its independent judgment as to whether or not the
amendment satisfies the requirements of this subdivision.
(c) If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect in
the absence of the invalid provision or application. To this end, the
provisions of this act are severable.
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(4) The financial crisis and regulatory uncertainty that were created
by the deregulated market have stifled investment in needed power plants.
(5) Deregulation of electricity, including the authorization of direct
transactions, creates uncertainty regarding the customer base that must
be served, making it impossible to conduct the long-term integrated
resource planning that is necessary for an environmentally sound
and reliable electricity system, and enables cost-shifting from large
customers to small.
(6) Despite the past failures of electricity deregulation, its
advocates are once again urging the Legislature and the Public Utilities
Commission to launch a further experiment that may inflict additional
damage on ratepayers and the California economy.
(b) In enacting this measure, it is the intent of the people to achieve
the following policy goals:
(1) Ensure that all customers receive reliable retail electric service at
just and reasonable rates.
(2) Provide a stable customer base for planning purposes, in order
to assure resource adequacy and prevent inappropriate cost shifting.
To that end, no new direct transactions shall be permitted, except as
provided in this measure.
(3) Ensure that all rates, terms, and conditions of retail electric service
are regulated by the Public Utilities Commission in a non-discriminatory
manner as to all suppliers of retail electric service, and that all electricity
service providers are under the jurisdiction of the commission.

This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with
the provisions of Section 8 of Article II of the California Constitution.
This initiative measure amends, repeals, and adds sections to the
Public Utilities Code; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be
deleted are printed in strikeout type and new provisions proposed to be
added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
Section 1. This measure shall be known and may be cited as “The
Repeal of Electricity Deregulation and Blackout Prevention Act.”
Section 2. (a) The people of the State of California fi nd and
declare all of the following:
(1) A reliable electricity system that delivers power to all consumers
at just and reasonable prices is vital to the health, safety, and well-being
of all Californians.
(2) Electricity is a unique good in modern society. It cannot be
stored, must be delivered to the entire grid at the same time it is
produced, and has no substitutes. Failure of supply for even a few
seconds can lead to blackouts and disruption.
(3) The deregulation of the electricity market in California was a
disastrous, ill-conceived experiment that led to rolling blackouts, supply
shortages, and market manipulation, resulting in billions of dollars in
excessive prices being borne by California ratepayers.
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(4) Ensure that the electrical system is developed in a manner
that mitigates and minimizes any adverse environmental impacts to
the maximum extent reasonably practicable by, among other things,
requiring that each retail seller of electricity obtain at least 20 percent
of its retail sales from eligible renewable energy resources no later than
December 31, 2010.
Section 3. Section 218.3 of the Public Utilities Code is amended
to read:
218.3. “Electric service provider” means an entity that offers
electrical service to customers within the service territory of an
electrical corporation, as defi ned in Section 218, but does not include
an entity that offers electrical service solely to service customer load
consistent with subdivision (b) of Section 218, and does not include an
electrical corporation, as defi ned in Section 218, or a public agency that
offers electrical service to residential and small commercial customers
within its jurisdiction, or within the service territory of a local
publicly owned electric utility. “Electric service provider” includes
the unregulated affiliates and subsidiaries of an electrical corporation,
as defi ned in Section 218. An electric service provider is subject to
the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the commission and the
provisions of this part, pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 394.
Section 4. Section 330 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
330. In order to provide guidance in carrying out this chapter, the
Legislature fi nds and declares all of the following:
(a) It is the intent of the Legislature that a cumulative rate reduction
of at least 20 percent be achieved not later than April 1, 2002, for
residential and small commercial customers, from the rates in effect on
June 10, 1996. In determining that the April 1, 2002, rate reduction has
been met, the commission shall exclude the costs of the competitively
procured electricity and the costs associated with the rate reduction
bonds, as defi ned in Section 840.
(b) The people, businesses, and institutions of California spend
nearly twenty-three billion dollars ($23,000,000,000) annually
on electricity, so that reductions in the price of electricity would
significantly benefit the economy of the state and its residents.
(c) The Public Utilities Commission has opened rulemaking and
investigation proceedings with regard to restructuring California’s
electric power industry and reforming utility regulation.
(d) The commission has found, after an extensive public review
process, that the interests of ratepayers and the state as a whole will
be best served by moving from the regulatory framework existing
on January 1, 1997, in which retail electricity service is provided
principally by electrical corporations subject to an obligation to provide
ultimate consumers in exclusive service territories with reliable electric
service at regulated rates, to a framework under which competition
would be allowed in the supply of electric power and customers would
be allowed to have the right to choose their supplier of electric power.
(e) Competition in the electric generation market will encourage
innovation, efficiency, and better service from all market participants,
and will permit the reduction of costly regulatory oversight.
(f) The delivery of electricity over transmission and distribution
systems is currently regulated, and will continue to be regulated to
ensure system safety, reliability, environmental protection, and fair
access for all market participants.
(g) Reliable electric service is of utmost importance to the safety,
health, and welfare of the state’s citizenry and economy. It is the intent
of the Legislature that electric industry restructuring should enhance
the reliability of the interconnected regional transmission systems, and
provide strong coordination and enforceable protocols for all users of
the power grid.
(h) It is important that sufficient supplies of electric generation
will be available to maintain the reliable service to the citizens and
businesses of the state.
(i) Reliable electric service depends on conscientious inspection and
maintenance of transmission and distribution systems. To continue and
enhance the reliability of the delivery of electricity, the Independent
System Operator and the commission, respectively, should set
inspection, maintenance, repair, and replacement standards.
(j) It is the intent of the Legislature that California enter into a
compact with western region states. That compact should require
the publicly and investor-owned utilities located in those states, that

sell energy to California retail customers, to adhere to enforceable
standards and protocols to protect the reliability of the interconnected
regional transmission and distribution systems.
(k) In order to achieve meaningful wholesale and retail competition in
the electric generation market, it is essential to do all of the following:
(1) Separate monopoly utility transmission functions from
competitive generation functions, through development of independent,
third-party control of transmission access and pricing.
(2) Permit all customers to choose from among competing suppliers
of electric power.
(3) Provide customers and suppliers with open, nondiscriminatory,
and comparable access to transmission and distribution services.
(l) The commission has properly concluded that:
(1) This competition will best be introduced by the creation of an
Independent System Operator and an independent Power Exchange.
(2) Generation of electricity should be open to competition.
(3) There is a need to ensure that no participant in these new market
institutions has the ability to exercise significant market power so that
operation of the new market institutions would be distorted.
(4) These new market institutions should commence simultaneously
with the phase in of customer choice, and the public will be best served
if these institutions and the nonbypassable transition cost recovery
mechanism referred to in subdivisions (s) to (w), inclusive, are in place
simultaneously and no later than January 1, 1998.
(m) It is the intention of the Legislature that California’s publicly
owned electric utilities and investor-owned electric utilities should
commit control of their transmission facilities to the Independent
System Operator. These utilities should jointly advocate to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission a pricing methodology for the
Independent System Operator that results in an equitable return on
capital investment in transmission facilities for all Independent System
Operator participants.
(n) Opportunities to acquire electric power in the competitive
market must be available to California consumers as soon as
practicable, but no later than January 1, 1998, so that all customers can
share in the benefits of competition.
(o) Under the existing regulatory framework, California’s electrical
corporations were granted franchise rights to provide electricity to
consumers in their service territories.
(p) Consistent with federal and state policies, California electrical
corporations invested in power plants and entered into contractual
obligations in order to provide reliable electrical service on a
nondiscriminatory basis to all consumers within their service territories
who requested service.
(q) The cost of these investments and contractual obligations are
currently being recovered in electricity rates charged by electrical
corporations to their consumers.
(r) Transmission and distribution of electric power remain essential
services imbued with the public interest that are provided over facilities
owned and maintained by the state’s electrical corporations.
(s) It is proper to allow electrical corporations an opportunity to
continue to recover, over a reasonable transition period, those costs
and categories of costs for generation-related assets and obligations,
including costs associated with any subsequent renegotiation or buyout
of existing generation-related contracts, that the commission, prior to
December 20, 1995, had authorized for collection in rates and that may
not be recoverable in market prices in a competitive generation market,
and appropriate additions incurred after December 20, 1995, for capital
additions to generating facilities existing as of December 20, 1995, that
the commission determines are reasonable and should be recovered,
provided that the costs are necessary to maintain those facilities
through December 31, 2001. In determining the costs to be recovered,
it is appropriate to net the negative value of above market assets against
the positive value of below market assets.
(t) The transition to a competitive generation market should be
orderly, protect electric system reliability, provide the investors in these
electrical corporations with a fair opportunity to fully recover the costs
associated with commission approved generation-related assets and
obligations, and be completed as expeditiously as possible.
(u) The transition to expanded customer choice, competitive
markets, and performance based ratemaking as described in
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Decision 95-12-063, as modified by Decision 96-01-009, of the Public
Utilities Commission, can produce hardships for employees who have
dedicated their working lives to utility employment. It is preferable that
any necessary reductions in the utility workforce directly caused by
electrical restructuring, be accomplished through offers of voluntary
severance, retraining, early retirement, outplacement, and related
benefits. Whether workforce reductions are voluntary or involuntary,
reasonable costs associated with these sorts of benefits should be
included in the competition transition charge.
(v) Charges associated with the transition should be collected over
a specific period of time on a nonbypassable basis and in a manner
that does not result in an increase in rates to customers of electrical
corporations. In order to insulate the policy of nonbypassability against
incursions, if exemptions from the competition transition charge are
granted, a fi rewall shall be created that segregates recovery of the cost
of exemptions as follows:
(1) The cost of the competition transition charge exemptions granted
to members of the combined class of residential and small commercial
customers shall be recovered only from those customers.
(2) The cost of the competition transition charge exemptions granted
to members of the combined class of customers other than residential
and small commercial customers shall be recovered only from those
customers. The commission shall retain existing cost allocation authority
provided that the fi rewall and rate freeze principles are not violated.
(w) It is the intent of the Legislature to require and enable electrical
corporations to monetize a portion of the competition transition
charge for residential and small commercial consumers so that these
customers will receive rate reductions of no less than 10 percent for
1998 continuing through 2002. Electrical corporations shall, by June 1,
1997, or earlier, secure the means to fi nance the competition transition
charge by applying concurrently for fi nancing orders from the Public
Utilities Commission and for rate reduction bonds from the California
Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank.
(x) California’s public utility electrical corporations provide
substantial benefits to all Californians, including employment and
support of the state’s economy. Restructuring the electric services
industry pursuant to the act that added this chapter will continue these
benefits, and will also offer meaningful and immediate rate reductions
for residential and small commercial customers, and facilitate
competition in the supply of electric power.
Section 5. Section 365 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
365. The actions of the commission pursuant to this chapter shall
be consistent with the fi ndings and declarations contained in Section
330. In addition, the commission shall do all of the following:
(a) Facilitate the efforts of the state’s electrical corporations to
develop and obtain authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission for the creation and operation of an Independent System
Operator and an independent Power Exchange, for the determination
of which transmission and distribution facilities are subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the commission, and for approval, to the extent
necessary, of the cost recovery mechanism established as provided in
Sections 367 to 376, inclusive. The commission shall also participate
fully in all proceedings before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in connection with the Independent System Operator
and the independent Power Exchange, and shall encourage the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to adopt protocols and procedures
that strengthen the reliability of the interconnected transmission
grid, encourage all publicly owned utilities in California to become
full participants, and maximize enforceability of such protocols and
procedures by all market participants.
(b) (1) Authorize direct transactions between electricity suppliers
and end use customers, subject to implementation of the nonbypassable
charge referred to in Sections 367 to 376, inclusive. Direct transactions
shall commence simultaneously with the start of an Independent System
Operator and Power Exchange referred to in subdivision (a). The
simultaneous commencement shall occur as soon as practicable, but no
later than January 1, 1998. The commission shall develop a phase-in
schedule at the conclusion of which all customers shall have the right to
engage in direct transactions. Any phase-in of customer eligibility for
direct transactions ordered by the commission shall be equitable to all
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customer classes and accomplished as soon as practicable, consistent
with operational and other technological considerations, and shall be
completed for all customers by January 1, 2002.
(2) Customers shall be eligible for direct access irrespective of any
direct access phase-in implemented pursuant to this section if at least
one-half of that customer’s electrical load is supplied by energy from a
renewable resource provider certified pursuant to Section 383, provided
however that nothing in this section shall provide for direct access for
electric consumers served by municipal utilities unless so authorized by
the governing board of that municipal utility.
Section 6. Section 365.5 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
365.5. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the commission from
exercising its authority to investigate a process for certification and
regulation of the rates, charges, terms, and conditions of default service.
If the commission determines that a process for certification and
regulation of default service is in the public interest, the commission
shall submit its fi ndings and recommendations to the Legislature
for approval.
Section 7. Section 366 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
366. (a) The commission shall take actions as needed to facilitate
direct transactions between electricity suppliers and
end-use customers. Customers shall be entitled to aggregate their
electrical loads on a voluntary basis, provided that each customer does
so by a positive written declaration. If no positive declaration is made
by a customer, that customer shall continue to be served by the existing
electrical corporation or its successor in interest, except aggregation by
community choice aggregators, accomplished pursuant to Section 366.2.
(b) Aggregation of customer electrical load shall be authorized by
the commission for all customer classes, including, but not limited,
to small commercial or residential customers. Aggregation may
be accomplished by private market aggregators, special districts,
or on any other basis made available by market opportunities and
agreeable by positive written declaration by individual consumers,
except aggregation by community choice aggregators, which shall be
accomplished pursuant to Section 366.2.
Section 8. Section 366 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:
366. (a) No new direct transactions for retail electric service
may be entered into after the effective date of this act, except by those
customers of an electrical corporation who were being served via a
direct transaction on January 1, 2005.
(b) A customer who was being served via a direct transaction on
January 1, 2005, may return to service by an electrical corporation
upon one year’s notice to the electrical corporation, and thereafter may
not enter into a new direct transaction. If a customer returns to service
by an electrical corporation prior to the expiration of the one year
notice period, that customer shall pay a generation rate that is equal to
the higher of the electrical corporation’s bundled generation portfolio
price or the current short-term market price until the one year notice
period has elapsed.
(c) A customer that was being served via a direct transaction on
January 1, 2005, may take temporary default service from an
electrical corporation, at a generation rate that is equal to the higher
of the electrical corporation’s bundled generation portfolio price or the
current short-term market price, for a period of no longer than
120 days. If the customer does not enter into a new direct transaction
by the end of the 120 day period, that customer may not thereafter
enter into a new direct transaction, and shall continue to be served
by the electrical corporation at the default service rate for a period
of one year, at which point the customer will be charged the bundled
generation portfolio price.
(d) Any customer that the commission has determined, in its
Decision 02-11-022, is responsible to pay a cost recovery surcharge as
a condition of having purchased electricity via a direct transaction shall
continue to pay the cost recovery surcharge until full collection is achieved.
(e) Nothing in this section alters the provisions of Sections 366.1 and
366.2, relating to community choice aggregation.
Section 9. Section 394 of the Public Utilities Code is amended
to read:
394. (a) As used in this section, “electric service provider” means
an entity that offers electrical service to customers within the service
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territory of an electrical corporation, but does not include an electrical
corporation, as defi ned in Section 218, does not include an entity that
offers electrical service solely to serve customer load consistent with
subdivision (b) of Section 218, and does not include a public agency that
offers electrical service to residential and small commercial customers
within its jurisdiction, or within the service territory of a local
publicly owned electric utility. “Electric service provider” includes the
unregulated affiliates and subsidiaries of an electrical corporation, as
defi ned in Section 218.
(b) Each electric service provider shall register with the commission.
As a precondition to registration, the electric service provider shall
provide, under oath, declaration, or affidavit, all of the following
information to the commission:
(1) Legal name and any other names under which the electric service
provider is doing business in California.
(2) Current telephone number.
(3) Current address.
(4) Agent for service of process.
(5) State and date of incorporation, if any.
(6) Number for a customer contact representative, or other personnel
for receiving customer inquiries.
(7) Brief description of the nature of the service being provided.
(8) Disclosure of any civil, criminal, or regulatory sanctions or
penalties imposed within the 10 years immediately prior to registration,
against the company or any owner, partner, officer, or director of the
company pursuant to any state or federal consumer protection law
or regulation, and of any felony convictions of any kind against the
company or any owner, partner, officer, or director of the company. In
addition, each electric service provider shall furnish the commission
with fi ngerprints for those owners, partners, officers, and managers
of the electric service provider specified by any commission decision
applicable to all electric service providers. The commission shall
submit completed fi ngerprint cards to the Department of Justice. Those
fi ngerprints shall be available for use by the Department of Justice and
the Department of Justice may transmit the fi ngerprints to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for a national criminal history record check.
The commission may use information obtained from a national criminal
history record check conducted pursuant to this section to determine an
electric service provider’s eligibility for registration.
(9) Proof of fi nancial viability. The commission shall develop
uniform standards for determining fi nancial viability and shall publish
those standards for public comment no later than March 31, 1998. In
determining the fi nancial viability of the electric service provider,
the commission shall take into account the number of customers the
potential registrant expects to serve, the number of kilowatthours of
electricity it expects to provide, and any other appropriate criteria to
ensure that residential and small commercial customers have adequate
recourse in the event of fraud or nonperformance.
(10) Proof of technical and operational ability. The commission shall
develop uniform standards for determining technical and operational
capacity and shall publish those standards for public comment no later
than March 31, 1998.
(c) Any registration filing approved by the commission prior to the
effective date of this section which does not comply in all respects with
the requirements of subdivision (a) of Section 394 shall nevertheless
continue in force and effect so long as within 90 days of the effective
date of this section the electric service provider undertakes to
supplement its registration filing to the satisfaction of the commission.
Any registration that is not supplemented by the required information
within the time set forth in this subdivision shall be suspended by the
commission and shall not be reinstated until the commission has
found the registration to be in full compliance with subdivision (a) of
Section 394.
(d) Any public agency offering aggregation services as provided for
in Section 366 solely to retail electric customers within its jurisdiction
that has registered with the commission prior to the enactment of this
section may voluntarily withdraw its registration to the extent that it is
exempted from registration under this chapter.
(e) Before reentering the market, electric service providers whose
registration has been revoked shall file a formal application with the

commission that satisfies the requirements set forth in Section 394.1 and
demonstrates the fitness and ability of the electric service provider to
comply with all applicable rules of the commission.
(f) Registration with the commission is an exercise of the licensing
function of the commission, and does not constitute regulation of the
rates or terms and conditions of service offered by electric service
providers. Nothing in this part authorizes the commission to regulate
the rates or terms and conditions of service offered by electric service
providers.
(f) Registration with the commission is an exercise of the licensing
function of the commission, and registration by an electric service
provider constitutes agreement of the electric service provider to
the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of its rates and terms and
conditions of service by the commission. The commission shall
exercise such jurisdiction, control, and regulation of electric service
providers in their provision of electrical service in the same manner
as its exercise of jurisdiction, control, and regulation of electrical
corporations, including, but not limited to, enforcement of: energy
procurement and contracting standards and requirements; resource
adequacy requirements; energy efficiency and demand response
requirements; renewable portfolio standards; and appropriate
assignment of costs among customers to prevent cost shifting.
Section 10. Section 399.15 of the Public Utilities Code is amended
to read:
399.15. (a) In order to fulfill unmet long-term resource needs, the
commission shall establish a renewables portfolio standard requiring
all electrical corporations to procure a minimum quantity of output
from eligible renewable energy resources as a specified percentage of
total kilowatthours sold to their retail end-use customers each calendar
year, if sufficient funds are made available pursuant to paragraph (2),
and Section 399.6 and Chapter 8.6 (commencing with Section 25740)
of Division 15 of the Public Resources Code, to cover the above-market
costs of eligible renewables, and subject to all of the following:
(1) An electric corporation shall not be required to enter into
long-term contracts with eligible renewable energy resources that exceed
the market prices established pursuant to subdivision (c) of this section.
(2) The Energy Commission shall provide supplemental energy
payments from funds in the New Renewable Resources Account in the
Renewable Resource Trust Fund to eligible renewable energy resources
pursuant to Chapter 8.6 (commencing with Section 25740) of Division
15 of the Public Resources Code, consistent with this article, for
above-market costs. Indirect costs associated with the purchase of
eligible renewable energy resources, such as imbalance energy charges,
sale of excess energy, decreased generation from existing resources,
or transmission upgrades shall not be eligible for supplemental energy
payments, but shall be recoverable by an electrical corporation in rates,
as authorized by the commission.
(3) For purposes of setting annual procurement targets, the
commission shall establish an initial baseline for each electrical
corporation based on the actual percentage of retail sales procured
from eligible renewable energy resources in 2001, and, to the extent
applicable, adjusted going forward pursuant to subdivision (a) of
Section 399.12.
(b) The commission shall implement annual procurement targets for
each electrical corporation as follows:
(1) Beginning on January 1, 2003, each electrical corporation shall,
pursuant to subdivision (a), increase its total procurement of eligible
renewable energy resources by at least an additional 1 percent of retail
sales per year so that 20 percent of its retail sales are procured from
eligible renewable energy resources no later than December 31, 2017.
An electrical corporation with 20 percent of retail sales procured from
eligible renewable energy resources in any year shall not be required to
increase its procurement of such resources in the following year.
(1) Beginning on January 1, 2003, each retail seller shall, pursuant
to subdivision (a), increase its total procurement of eligible renewable
energy resources by at least an additional 1 percent of retail sales per
year so that 20 percent of its retail sales are procured from eligible
renewable energy resources no later than December 31, 2010.
(2) Only for purposes of establishing these targets, the commission
shall include all power sold to retail customers by the Department of
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Water Resources pursuant to Section 80100 of the Water Code in the
calculation of retail sales by an electrical corporation.
(3) In the event that an electrical corporation fails to procure
sufficient eligible renewable energy resources in a given year to meet
any annual target established pursuant to this subdivision, the electrical
corporation shall procure additional eligible renewable energy resources
in subsequent years to compensate for the shortfall if sufficient funds are
made available pursuant to paragraph (2), and Section 399.6 and
Chapter 8.6 (commencing with Section 25740) of Division 15 of the
Public Resources Code, to cover the above-market costs of eligible
renewables.
(4) If supplemental energy payments from the Energy Commission,
in combination with the market prices approved by the commission, are
insufficient to cover the above-market costs of eligible renewable energy
resources, the commission shall allow an electrical corporation to limit
its annual procurement obligation to the quantity of eligible renewable
energy resources that can be procured with available supplemental
energy payments.
(c) The commission shall establish a methodology to determine
the market price of electricity for terms corresponding to the length of
contracts with renewable generators, in consideration of the following:
(1) The long-term market price of electricity for fi xed price
contracts, determined pursuant to the electrical corporation’s general
procurement activities as authorized by the commission.
(2) The long-term ownership, operating, and fi xed-price fuel costs
associated with fi xed-price electricity from new generating facilities.
(3) The value of different products including baseload, peaking, and
as-available output.
(d) The establishment of a renewables portfolio standard shall not
constitute implementation by the commission of the federal Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-617).
(e) The commission shall consult with the Energy Commission in
calculating market prices under subdivision (c) and establishing other
renewables portfolio standard policies.
Section 11. Chapter 2.4 (commencing with Section 400) is added to
Part 1 of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code, to read:
CHAPTER 2.4. THE RELIABLE ELECTRIC SERVICE ACT
400. This chapter shall be known, and may be cited, as the Reliable
Electric Service Act.
400.1. The commission and the Legislature shall do all of the following:
(a) Restore and affirm the electric utility’s obligation to serve all of
its customers reliably and at just and reasonable rates.
(b) Eliminate opportunities for market manipulation and assure the
best value for consumers by authorizing cost-based construction and
operation of new electric plants as well as competitive utility wholesale
electricity procurement.
(c) Protect consumers, the environment, and the reliability of the
electricity system, by establishing a comprehensive long-term integrated
resource planning process, under regulation, in order to ensure resource
adequacy and reasonably priced electricity. Such a process shall
include, as a first priority, funding of all cost-effective energy efficiency
and conservation programs, and increasing the proportion of electricity
provided from cost-effective renewable resources.
(d) Establish and enforce resource adequacy requirements to
ensure that adequate physical generating capacity dedicated to serving
all load requirements is available to meet peak demand and planning
and operating reserves, at such locations and at such times as may be
necessary to ensure local area reliability and system reliability, at just
and reasonable rates. Resource adequacy requirements shall apply in a
nondiscriminatory manner to all load serving entities.
(e) Advance and promote opportunities for consumers to use
innovative new technologies, such as distributed generation, consistent
with grid reliability and environmental protection and improvement,
provided that residential and small commercial customers with average
usage of less than 1,000 kilowatt-hours per month and occupying a
building that was constructed prior to January 1, 2006, shall not be
required to take service under a time-differentiated rate schedule
without their affirmative written consent.
400.2. (a) An electrical corporation has an obligation to plan
for and provide its customers with reliable electric service at just and
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reasonable rates, pursuant to Section 451, including those customers
who purchase standby service from the electrical corporation.
(b) For purposes of this chapter, “electric service” includes providing
adequate and efficient resources, including utility-owned and procured
generation resources, such as new and repowered generation resources,
cogeneration, and renewable generation resources, transmission and
distribution resources, metering and billing, funding for cost-effective
energy efficiency and other demand reduction resources, and employing
an adequately sized, well-trained utility workforce, including contracting
for maintenance of generation facilities.
400.3. (a) The Public Utilities Commission shall establish a
process of resource selection and procurement that achieves the best
value for ratepayers as its primary goal.
(b) The commission shall ensure that each electrical corporation
achieves the best value for its ratepayers by maintaining a diversified
portfolio of non-utility generation under contract with the utility and
utility-owned generation, consistent with the electrical corporation’s
approved long-term integrated resource plan, taking into account
price, reliability, stability, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, system
impacts, resource diversity, financial integrity of the utility, risk, and
environmental performance.
(c) The resource selection process may achieve the best value for
ratepayers, as described in subdivisions (a) and (b), by utilizing the
following approaches to compare the benefits and costs of alternative
resource options:
(1) Competitive solicitations for non-utility generation.
(2) Bilateral contracts for non-utility generation.
(3) Cost-based utility-owned generation that is regulated by the
commission.
(d) For purposes of this act, “non-utility generation” means
facilities for the generation of electricity owned and operated by an
entity other than an electrical corporation; and “load serving entity”
does not include a local publicly owned electric utility as defined in
Section 9604, the State Water Resources Development System commonly
known as the State Water Project, or customer self-generation.
400.4. (a) The commission, in consultation with the Independent
System Operator, shall establish resource adequacy requirements to
ensure that adequate physical generating capacity dedicated to serving
all load requirements is available to meet peak demand and planning
and operating reserves, at or deliverable to such locations and at such
times as may be necessary to ensure local area reliability and system
reliability at just and reasonable rates.
(b) The commission shall implement and enforce these resource
adequacy requirements in a nondiscriminatory manner on all load
serving entities.
(c) Resource adequacy requirements established by the commission
shall provide for and assure all of the following:
(1) System wide and local area grid reliability.
(2) Adequate physical generating capacity dedicated to serve all
load requirements, including planning and operating reserves, where
and when it is needed.
(3) Adequate and timely investment in new generating capacity to meet
future load requirements, including planning and operating reserves.
(4) Market power mitigation.
(5) Deliverability.
(6) Resource commitments by load serving entities at least three
years in advance of need, in order to assure that new resources can be
constructed if necessary to meet the need.
(d) Pursuant to its authority to revoke or suspend registration
pursuant to Section 394.25, the commission shall suspend the registration
for a specified period, or revoke the registration, of an electric service
provider that fails to comply with the rules and regulations adopted by the
commission to enforce resource adequacy requirements.
Section 12. The Legislature may amend this act only to achieve its
purposes and intent, by legislation receiving at least a two-thirds vote of
each house and signature by the Governor.
Section 13. The provisions of this act are severable. If any
provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

